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ABSTRACT 
 
Crowded exits arise in stocks where short-sellers hold large positions relative to normal 
trading volume, and when a catalyst prompts short-sellers to cover their positions rapidly and 
simultaneously. Where short-covering is large compared to normal trading volume, we would 
expect upward pressure on the stock price. Using a stock lending database for up to 681 
stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1 September, 2003 to 31 May, 2007, we 
find that crowded exits are associated with positive abnormal returns. This result is both 
statistically and economically significant. Short-sellers who cover their positions rapidly 
avoid losses, indicating that they are well informed. Those that fail to cover suffer significant 
losses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The study of short-selling constraints and their impact on market efficiency has been a 
popular area of research for over thirty years. The literature identifies two types of short-
selling constraint: ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. Direct constraints include legal restrictions on short-
selling and the cost of borrowing stock, and are relatively simple to identify and understand. 
By contrast, indirect constraints have proved to be less tractable. D’Avolio (2002) and Nagel 
(2005) call for greater research into the nature and impact of indirect short-selling constraints. 
Geczy et al. (2002) argue that if short-selling problems explain the availability of factor 
portfolio returns to unskilled managers, then these short-selling problems are not borrowing 
costs, but perhaps liquidity constraints. In this paper we consider crowded exits, an indirect 
constraint on short-selling. Crowded exits have yet to be examined in the literature, and this 
study fills this gap. Crowded exits arise in stocks where short-sellers hold large positions 
relative to normal trading volume, and when a catalyst prompts short-sellers to rapidly and 
simultaneously cover their positions. Catalysts include, but are not limited to, public news 
releases by companies. The temporary excess of demand for stock relative to normal trading 
volume leads to upward pressure on the stock price and these events are associated with 
losses to short-sellers that are economically and statistically significant. As such, the risk of a 
crowded exit represents an indirect constraint on short-selling. In this paper, we examine a 
large, stock lending database for conditions where liquidity constraints impact on short-
sellers. 
 
As part of any taxonomy of crowded exits, it is helpful to explain how a short position might 
become ‘crowded’ in the first instance. One possible scenario is outlined below. Initially, one 
or more traders with negative information about a company short-sells stock in that company. 
This represents informed trading and leads to an increase in the number of shares shorted. 
This increase in short-interest is made public, as most developed stock markets require the 
publication of data on short-selling or stock lending, in the interests of transparency. A 
substantial body of empirical research shows that heavily shorted stocks perform poorly 
(Dechow et al., 2001, Angel et al., 2003, Gopalan, 2003, Ackert and Athanassakos, 2005, 
Diether et al., 2008 and Boehmer et al., 2008). Market participants who are aware of this 
literature can simply short-sell stocks that are seen to be heavily shorted, in an attempt to 
benefit from the short-sellers’ information. This is an ‘imitation strategy’, other examples of 
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which are described in Fligstein (1996, 2001), White (1981, 2001) and Mackenzie (2006). In 
so far as this imitation strategy occurs in markets, it follows that heavily shorted stock 
positions contain both informed traders and noise traders. Imitation strategies, however, 
contain the seeds of their own destruction. In this illustration, imitation leads to an increase in 
the size of the short position relative to the liquidity of the stock. A crowded position thus 
develops, based on a mix of ‘informed short-selling’ and ‘rational imitation’.  
 
We refer to short positions that are large relative to normal trading volume as ‘crowded 
positions’. With a catalyst, rapid and simultaneous short-covering can commence and the 
crowded position becomes a ‘crowded exit’. The idea is akin to the audience in a crowded 
theatre rushing to a narrow exit door once the fire alarm sounds…only so many can leave the 
building in any given interval of time. A variety of catalysts for a crowded exit are possible: a 
company could release new, positive information to the market; a sell-side analyst could 
upgrade his earnings forecast or trading recommendation on a stock; or informed short-sellers 
could receive new, private information and start to cover their positions, to be followed by 
imitators. A further catalyst could be that short-sellers become unable to hold on to their short 
positions. This could be due to stock loan recall, client redemptions, margin calls or the rigid 
application of risk control mechanisms. The resulting short covering could be misconstrued 
as informed buying, leading imitators to cover their own positions. Finally, manipulators 
buying shares in a company could prompt short covering amongst traders who misinterpret 
the manipulative trades as informed buying. From interviews with practitioners, we find that 
short-sellers perceive crowded exits to be risky: it could become difficult to cover a short 
position when desired, or the short-seller could suffer losses due to ‘market impact’ when 
demanding liquidity to cover a short position quickly.  
 
We study instances of crowded exits by making use of a relatively new commercial stock 
lending database for up to 681 stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1 
September, 2003 to 31 May, 2007. The main findings of this research are as follows: crowded 
exits are associated with positive abnormal returns (i.e. losses to short-sellers) of up to 27% 
over a period of 60 days, and this result is both statistically and economically significant. We 
infer that short-sellers thus face an important indirect constraint on short-selling in the form 
of crowded exits. New, long-only investors would generally find it difficult to exploit this 
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finding by buying into crowded exits, as by definition these are illiquid positions; however, 
incumbent short-sellers, unable to readily cover their positions, suffer losses.   
 
2. Data 
 
2.1 Data Sources 
 
We create a new dataset for the purposes of this research by merging data from two sources. 
The first of these is a commercial database of UK stock lending data from Index Explorers 
Ltd1. This contains daily information on stock lending starting on 3 September, 2003 when 
the database came into existence. At inception, this database included stocks from the 350 
largest companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. The data is largely sourced from 
CREST — the organisation responsible for settlement of all trades on the London Stock 
Exchange. The amount of stock on loan is updated daily, but with a three day reporting lag 
(before 12 December, 2005 the lag was five days). Over time, the coverage of companies in 
the database increases through the addition of smaller capitalization stocks so that by the end 
date for this sample, 31 May, 2007, there is stock lending data for 681 companies. The 
smallest of these companies have market capitalizations of approximately £25 million 
(approximately U.S.$40 million), as of 2007. A number of companies cease to exist at some 
point during the 45 months (979 trading days) studied. This could be as a result of a merger 
or acquisition, the lapsing of the company into administrative receivership, or a change to 
private ownership. Such companies are included in the database until the date of their de-
listing, to prevent survivorship bias. We make use of all stocks in the database and all trading 
days in the sample for which stock lending data is available. 
 
The Index Explorers database includes the following daily information for each stock:  
 
• Date 
• Name of company 
                                                          
1 Index Explorers data has also been used by Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007) and Mackenzie and Hendry (2008). 
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• SEDOL (a unique company identifier code) 
• Turnover (defined as the number of shares traded that day)  
• Stock Price (defined as the previous day’s closing stock price) 
• Volume (defined as turnover multiplied by stock price) 
• Market Capitalisation (defined as number of shares in issue multiplied by stock price) 
• Shares on Loan (defined as the number of shares reported to CREST as being on loan) 
• Volume on Loan (defined as shares on loan multiplied by stock price) 
• Percentage of Market Capitalization on Loan (defined as the volume of shares on loan 
divided by the market capitalization) 
• Dividend Record Dates (the dates on which the recorded owners of shares on that day 
become entitled to receive the next dividend payment) 
• Stock Utilisation Rate (the percentage of shares available for borrowing that are 
actually borrowed) 
• Weighted Mean Stock Lending Fees (a weighted average of the fees paid by stock 
borrowers to stock lenders on initiation of the stock loan, measured as a proportion of 
the value of shares borrowed). 
 
We use Datastream to obtain the following data for all for all FTSE All Share Index 
constituents from 1 September, 2002 to 31 May, 2007: 
 
• Date 
• Name of company 
• SEDOL (a unique company identifier code) 
• Daily stock returns (defined as the total return for a stock on that date) 
• Book value per share (this value is generally updated annually for each U.K. company 
and is reported to the public via financial statements that are published up to six 
month in arrears. Datastream then ‘backfills’ the new book value to the end of the last 
financial year. To account for the possible delay in reporting book value per share and 
to avoid look-ahead bias, we shift the ‘book value per share series’ back by six 
months for each company, thus reflecting what is ‘knowable’ to market participants at 
any time) 
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• Free float percentage of shares (defined as the percentage of the total number of 
shares in issue that are available to ordinary investors i.e. that are not held away from 
the market by government or close family interests). 
 
To facilitate the estimation of abnormal stock returns using an asset pricing model, we collect 
stock returns data for the year before the start of the Index Explorers database. This 
‘formation period’ runs from 1 September, 2002 to 1 September, 2003 and is used to estimate 
the beta of each stock in the study.  
 
Using each company’s SEDOL code as a unique identifier to reconcile stocks across the two 
databases, we merge the two databases, and construct a data set including trading and 
fundamental information for up to 681 stocks involved in stock lending activities on the 
London Stock Exchange, during the period from 3 September, 2003 to 31 May, 2007. 
Overall, the dataset is an unbalanced panel of data for between 350 and 681 companies 
covering 979 trading days with 12 data items per firm day, plus a series of transformations 
such as the natural logarithms of daily stock returns. 
 
2.2 Stock Lending as a Proxy for Short-Selling 
 
Direct data on short-selling is not publicly available in the U.K. Instead, stock lending data is 
available, on a daily basis. Stock lending acts as a proxy for short-selling, as the process of 
short-selling generally requires stock to be borrowed to facilitate settlement of the trade. 
MacKenzie and Henry (2008) state that: “The use of securities lending data is a fairly new 
innovation in the literature and only a handful of papers have had access to this type of data, 
including D’Avolio (2002), Cohen et al. (2007) and Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007).” However, 
there are a number of problems with using stock lending data as a proxy for short-selling.  
 
First, shares do not need to be borrowed to undertake ‘naked’ short-selling (i.e. short-selling 
where there is no intention of subsequently settling the trade). Naked short-selling for periods 
 8 
of one day or longer is unlikely to be common, however, as it involves failed settlement.  
‘Repeat offenders’ would soon become known to the brokers for such trades, who would 
cease dealing with them.2  Intra-day short-selling, though, does not require the delivery of 
stock for settlement at the end of the day, and so would not be revealed by daily stock lending 
data. Jones (2004) finds that intra-day shorting represents about 5% of daily volume in the 
early 1930s. 
 
Second, stock lending occurs for a number of reasons other than short-selling. In general, 
borrowing shares results in the temporary receipt of legal ownership of the securities and so 
the borrower is entitled to dividends, voting rights, and so forth. Strategies exist to benefit 
from these arrangements. These include borrowing stock so as to exercise a vote at a firm’s 
General Meeting. Such a strategy would be illegal in the U.S., but it is merely regarded as 
unethical in the U.K. To prevent this practice, stock lenders are recommended to recall their 
shares prior to voting dates (Myners, 2001)3. Another strategy involving stock borrowing is 
‘dividend tax arbitrage’, a strategy that is feasible when a ‘borrower’ has a tax advantage over 
the ‘lender’. Christoffersen et al. (2002, 2005) demonstrate increases in securities lending 
around dividend record dates. As a result of these various practices, the dataset can become 
obfuscated. Christophe et al. (2005) discuss the problem of obfuscation in short-interest data 
arising from the aggregation of short positions from market participants with differing 
motivations (e.g. market makers, option-market arbitrageurs, traders expecting stock price 
declines). They provide evidence that some of the component parts that are aggregated in 
short interest data are negatively correlated with one another. With stock lending data, an 
even greater number of motivations can exist, including financing purposes and borrowing to 
exercise voting rights. One of the crucial issues for this study concerns the time around the 
dividend dates, since dividend tax arbitrage is common in practice. To minimize the risk that 
stock lending for dividend tax arbitrage is confounded with borrowing to facilitate short-
selling, we remove data from three weeks before until three weeks after the dividend record 
date for each stock in this study of stock lending data. This is consistent with the method 
employed by Saffi & Sigurdsson (2007). In studies that use stock lending data, but that do not 
                                                          
2 For instance, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (1998) reported it conducted 768 investigations, and made 15 
prosecutions in 1997 for breach of short-selling rules that included a prohibition of ‘naked’ short-selling. 
3 Myners Report, 2001. http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/media/DCB/53/myners_principles_web.pdf 
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adjust for dividend tax arbitrage (e.g. Au et al., 2007), results have not been consistent with 
those found in the bulk of the literature.  
 
Third, the extent to which market practitioners fail to fulfil their obligations to report stock 
lending to the market authorities is a further limitation on the use of stock lending data as a 
proxy for short-selling. Discussions with practitioners involved in stock lending suggest that 
this problem is rare, but unavoidable. 
 
Finally, derivatives can be used to effect transactions that are economically equivalent to 
short-selling (Ofek et al., 2004). The extent to which the use of derivatives to facilitate short-
selling is transmitted into the stock lending market influences the usefulness of stock lending 
data as a proxy for short-selling. Discussions with stock-lending practitioners suggests that 
the majority, but not all, short-sale-equivalent trades using derivatives are ultimately hedged 
by the counter-parties to those trades, through borrowing stock and selling short.  
 
2.3 Advantages and Limitations of the Dataset 
 
A number of studies into short-selling make use of monthly data (Senchack and Starks, 1993 
and Dechow et al., 2001, Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor, 2007). However, Christophe et al. 
(2007) criticise the use of monthly short-selling data, as it “represents only a snap-shot of 
total shorted shares on one day during the month.” Cohen et al. (2007) find that almost half 
the securities lending contracts they study are closed out within two weeks, while the median 
contract length is 11 days. This suggests that monthly data could be inadequate for 
understanding the trading practices of short-sellers. The dataset used for this study 
incorporates daily data on shares borrowed (a proxy for shares shorted). This higher 
frequency data allows for an appropriate degree of granularity for the study of crowded exits.  
 
Some studies obtain trade-by-trade (or ‘flow’) data on stock lending or short-selling. These 
same studies tend to investigate shorter time periods. There is a balance to be had, though: 
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although flow data provides the highest degree of granularity, it would be arduous to study 
flow data for long periods of time. However, studies over longer periods could reveal trends 
and cycles not found in shorter periods. Christophe et al. (2007) take flow data for a ten 
month period and aggregate it into daily data. Similarly, Diether et al. (2008) obtain tick by 
tick short-sale data for over 3,800 stocks during 2005 and aggregate it for each stock to the 
daily level. 
 
Due to differences in regulatory and institutional frameworks, evidence from studies of U.S. 
data is not necessarily representative of behaviour outside the U.S. markets. For example, in 
the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority does not impose specific restrictions or 
controls on short-selling, unlike in the U.S. Instead, short-sellers are subject to general market 
and regulatory arrangements, including market abuse principles. Furthermore, studying data 
from outside the U.S. can be used to counter the criticism that observed regularities in 
empirical studies are simply due to data mining. A limited number of studies investigate 
short-selling and its impact on stock prices outside the U.S.(Aitken et al., 1998, Biais et al., 
1999, Poitras, 2002, Ackert and Athanassakos, 2005, and Au et al., 2007). However, these 
studies do not involve an investigation of crowded exits, as considered in this paper.  
 
Geczy et al. (2002) examines shares available for borrowing (and thus available for shorting), 
based on a single lender of stock for a twelve month period. D’Avolio (2002) examines an 
eighteen month period of data from one stock lender. This research draws upon a longer time 
period than either Geczy et al. or D’Avolio, and uses market-wide data on stock lending, thus 
removing the problem of substitution effects across lenders that might be present in studies 
based upon a single stock lender. As such, this research makes a contribution to the empirical 
literature. 
 
By observing the differences in returns between equally-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolios, Asquith et al. (2005) demonstrate that the level of short-selling is more 
informative as a negative sentiment indicator for smaller capitalization stocks than for larger 
stocks. Au et al. (2007) suggest that a study based on larger capitalization stocks will produce 
more conservative estimates for the relationship between short-selling and stock returns 
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compared to a study that includes smaller, less liquid stocks. The smallest stocks in our 
dataset have a market capitalization of approximately £25 million. Thus, a limitation of the 
dataset is that it includes only the larger stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
However, this also suggests a degree of conservatism in any findings. 
 
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dataset forms an ‘unbalanced panel’ dataset in which some cross-sectional units have 
some of the time periods missing. This form of panel is a result of the number of companies 
recorded in the Index Explorers database growing over time as smaller capitalization stocks 
are added. The resulting dataset contains 10,259,946 observations in the overall sample; 
6,542,712 of which are non-blank.  
 
In Table 1, descriptive statistics are produced for three points in time: the first day of the 
sample time period for which all the variables existed (09/01/2003), the last day of the sample 
time period (05/31/2007) and the mid-point (07/15/2005). The mean percentage of market 
capitalization on loan is a low figure for each of the snapshot dates (less than 3.5%), but is 
positively skewed. From the Jarque-Bera probabilities, it can be seen that the first five 
variables are not normally-distributed.  
 
[INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Histograms for each of six variables are presented in Table 2. For the purpose of 
visualization, the histograms are constructed using the mid-point snapshots. In order to 
improve the granularity of the histograms, any outliers further than three standard deviations 
from the mean are removed (this is done only for illustrative purposes with these histograms 
and does not affect the rest of the study).  
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[INSERT Table 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics for the logarithms of the six variables considered 
earlier.  
 
[INSERT Table 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT Table 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
An examination of the time series of percentage of market capitalization on loan series for 
each stock shows that these can be volatile series. Dividend-paying stocks often experience 
large increases in shares on loan around divided record dates, indicating a dividend capture 
effect that is consistent with dividend tax arbitrage. Nevertheless, some cross-sections 
experience a consistently high level through the observed period. During some dates in the 
sample the maximum value for this series exceeds 100% for some companies, signifying that 
borrowed shares have been re-lent. 
 
For the first and last snap-shot dates (09/01/2003 and 05/31/2007), we construct box-plots for 
each of the six variables considered above, to provide a visual summary of outliers in the 
dataset. These are shown in Table 5. 
 
[INSERT Table 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For each variable considered above, we identify outliers in the study sample using two 
techniques. First, we observe data points that lie more than three standard deviations from the 
mean for each variable. Secondly, we observe daily changes in each variable that are more 
than three standard deviations from the mean daily change. Table 6 reports the frequency of 
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these outliers by variable. In studying crowded exits, we are concerned with exceptional 
situations for short-sellers. As such, ‘outliers’ in each variable are likely to be important and 
so are not removed from the dataset.   
 
[INSERT Table 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
2.5 Asset Pricing Model for Estimating Abnormal Returns 
 
In choosing an asset pricing model for the purposes of calculating abnormal returns, we note 
that Asquith and Moelbroek (1996) establish that the negative relation between excess returns 
and short positions is robust to a variety of techniques for calculating excess returns. Dechow 
et al. (2001) measure excess returns by adjusting each firm’s return by the equal weighted 
return for all NYSE and AMEX shares over the same time period. They make no adjustment 
for risk across firms and cite previous research in this field that has been robust to changes in 
the asset pricing model used. Figlewski (1981) and Figlewski & Webb (1993) make use of 
the CAPM model. Asquith et al. (2005) and Boehmer et al. (2008) use several asset pricing 
models to estimate abnormal returns for short-sellers but find no significant difference 
between the results. Cavazos and Savor (2007) apply both benchmark-adjusted returns 
approach and Fama-French three factors regression to study the relationship between short 
selling activities and subsequent abnormal returns, and obtain similar results for both. In fact, 
results in this research space have been uniformly robust to changes in asset pricing model. 
Noting this, we use the CAPM model for its simplicity and its relevance to practitioners. 
Abnormal returns are calculated as: 
 
( )[ ]tftmitftiti RRRRAR ,,,,, −+−= β               (1) 
 
Where tiR ,  is the return of stock i on day t, and tfR ,  is the risk-free rate on day t. tmR ,  is the 
market return on day t, which is calculated from the total return index for the FTSE All Share 
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index, a broad, capitalization weighted index for the London market. iβ  represents the 
correlation between the returns on stock i and the market return premium, which is estimated 
using CAPM over the period from 2 September, 2002 to 31 August, 2003, which is a one-
year period that precedes my stock lending sample data period. We use 3-month LIBOR as 
the risk free rate. LIBOR is commonly used as a risk-free proxy. We note that this series was 
‘well-behaved’ during the period of study, but later became unusually dislocated during the 
2007-2009 U.S. and U.K. banking crisis.  In a study that uses U.K. stock lending data from 
CREST, Au et al. (2007) use weekly one-month LIBOR rates as their measure of the risk-
free rate and estimate one-month cumulative abnormal returns relative to FTSE 350 index 
returns.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Definitions of Variables 
 
We might expect firms with more shares in issue to have a potentially greater amount of 
shorted stock. Thus, we standardize shares on loan first by the number of shares outstanding 
and, second, by the free float number of shares.  Each of these measures serves as a proxy for 
short interest.  
 
The proportion of market capitalization on loan (MCOL) of a stock on any given day is 
calculated as: 
 
ti,
ti,
, Shares gOutstandin
 loanon  Shares
=tiMCOL           (2) 
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This measure represents the proportion of a company i’s outstanding shares that are on loan 
on day t. By dividing by outstanding shares, this ensures that the measure of short interest is 
not dominated by larger firms.  
 
We introduce the proportion of free float on loan (FFOL) as a second measure of short-
interest that is better attuned to the liquidity of a stock. It is calculated as: 
 
ti,
ti,
, Float Free of Size
 Loanon  Shares
=tiFFOL            (3) 
 
The ‘size of free float’ is the total number of shares in issue that are available to ordinary 
investors (i.e. excluding shares held by government or long-term family interests). 
 
To identify ‘crowded positions’, we also measure the shares on loan for each firm day 
relative to the average daily number of shares traded in the company4. This measure is widely 
used by short-sellers and is known as the Days to Cover Ratio (DCR). The higher this ratio, 
the more difficult it should be for short-sellers to liquidate their positions without having 
market impact. The ratio is calculated as: 
 
ti,
ti,
ti, Traded SharesDaily  Average
Loanon  Shares
 (DCR) RatioCover   toDays =            (4) 
 
ti,Loanon  Shares  is the closing number of shares on loan for stock i on day t. 
ti,edSharesTradDaily  Average  is the moving average of the number of shares traded for stock 
i from days (t-61) to (t-1). We choose 60 days of trading volume as a compromise between 
                                                          
4 The average daily number of shares traded in a company is also known as ‘normal market size’. 
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the risk of including out-dated information on number of shares traded and the risk of one or 
more exceptional days influencing the moving average figure. 
 
3.2 Constructing Portfolios 
 
One aim of this paper is to measure the abnormal returns of stocks experiencing crowded 
exits. A portfolio approach is applied as it allows us to replicate gross and risk-adjusted 
returns for a potential trading strategy; and it captures certain non-linearities that might 
characterize the patterns of subsequent returns (Pan and Poteshman, 2006). For each day, we 
sort the data to construct equal-weighted portfolios containing stocks identified as going 
through crowded exits. We study the characteristics of the securities included in the crowded 
exit portfolios, and estimate the abnormal portfolio returns for subsequent time periods. 
 
We use two steps to select portfolios of stocks. The first step is a simple sort, identifying 
stocks on each day based on their Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) ranking relative to other 
stocks. This simple sort thus creates portfolios that differ by the ‘crowdedness of short 
positions’. The second step is a double sort. In addition to sorting by DCR, we also divide 
portfolios according to whether or not each stock is experiencing exceptional short covering. 
 
Simple Sorts 
 
For each day, we rank all stocks by DCR. We then construct three portfolios containing the 
99th, 95th, and 90th percentile of stocks by DCR. These higher percentiles represent the most 
crowded short positions under our definition. A prerequisite for a crowded exit is that the 
stock should have a high level of short interest relative to its liquidity, and this simple sort 
captures that condition.  
 
Double Sorts 
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We carry out simultaneous sorts, creating portfolios based on a ranking of stocks by DCR and 
also whether or not they meet the test of showing an exceptional decrease in shares on loan. 
Instead of sorting stocks into independent quintiles twice, we sort stocks into 99th, 95th, and 
90th percentiles based on DCR, and narrow down the portfolios by controlling for exceptional 
changes in short interest on the previous day. We define the resultant portfolios as portfolios 
of stocks experiencing crowded exits: these portfolios include stocks with high DCRs, and 
showing exceptional changes in short interest on the previous day. We use two criteria to 
define an exceptional reduction in the short interest level. First, we filter the data to include 
only stocks with decreasing shares on loan. See equation (5) below: 
 
Change in shares on loan (t) = shares on loan (t) – shares on loan (t-1)  (5) 
 
A negative number indicates that short-sellers are covering their positions on day t. 
 
Only publicly-traded stocks are generally loaned and so it important in any study of liquidity 
problems to consider each firm’s free-float rather than total shares outstanding. We use the 
proportion of free float on loan in defining an exceptional decrease in the short interest level. 
We first calculate the change in the free float on loan (CFFL) from day t-1 to day t. The 
average change across all stocks for day t is defined as the cross sectional mean on day t, 
according to the equation below: 
Average market change ( tmCFFL , ) = n
CFFL
n
i
ti∑
=1
,
     (6) 
 
Where n is the total number of stocks in the universe on day t. We adjust the daily change in 
free float on loan for stock i ( tiCFFL , ) for the market average change, and obtain the adjusted 
daily change in free float on loan relative to the market average change, as shown below: 
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Relative daily change for stock i ( tiRCFFL , ) = 
tm
ti
CFFL
CFFL
,
,     (7) 
 
Next, we test whether or not each tiRCFFL ,  is exceptional. For each firm day, we calculate 
tiRCFFL ,  for each day from day (t-21) to day (t-1) and measure the mean and standard 
deviation of this series. If tiRCFFL ,  exceeds ± 2 standard deviations, we determine this to be 
an exceptional change. If this exceptional change is accompanied by fewer shares on loan and 
a lower CFFL, it is defined as an exceptional decrease in the level of short interest. Using this 
technique and having already undertaken a simple sort, we proceed to separate each of the 
DCR groups into two smaller portfolios: a Crowded Exit Portfolio (where each stock 
experiences an exceptional decrease in short interest) and a Not Crowded Exit Portfolio (the 
stocks do not experience an exceptional decrease in short interest). 
 
We study the characteristics of securities found in the Crowded Exit Portfolios and compare 
to those for the Not Crowded Exit Portfolios. These characteristics include the short interest 
ratios defined in Section 3.1; and liquidity factors (turnover by shares, and the percentage of 
outstanding shares that are free floating). We also measure fundamental factors, including 
market capitalization, market-to-book, volatility of returns, and past returns. The ‘past return’ 
is the raw return for a portfolio of stocks over the previous 20 trading days. 
 
3.3 Abnormal Returns around Crowded Exits 
 
Portfolio abnormal returns are estimated from the CAPM model, as described in Section 2.5. 
We calculate equal-weighted portfolio abnormal returns for each portfolio resulting from a 
sort. In measuring abnormal returns following crowded exits, for each portfolio we skip one 
day and hold the portfolios over N trading days. We start the holding period on day (t+2) to 
reduce the risk that stock prices are disproportionately at either bid or ask (the ‘bid-ask 
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bounce problem’). We calculate Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) over a series of 
holding periods (1, 5, 10, 20 and 60 days) to investigate the aggregate losses to short-sellers 
who cannot or do not cover their positions.  
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for periods of up to 60 days are estimated for each day, and 
thus there is a problem of ‘overlapping’ data to address. Estimates based on overlapping 
periods could capture autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in a firm’s excess returns, thus 
biasing the results. Senchack and Starks (1993) use monthly data and apply an event window 
covering 15 days before and after short interest announcement date to avoid the overlapping 
problem. Angel et al. (2003) study stocks returns by partitioning their study sample into non-
overlapping four-day sub-samples. However, we wish to use our daily data to study periods 
of up to 60 days and so partitioning would not be suitable for this study. Since we rank by 
DCR daily and hold portfolios for a subsequent N days, we need to adjust for unknown 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in returns. The Newey-West (1987) Heterockedasticity 
Autocorrelation Covariance (HAC) Matrix Estimator is widely used for such adjustment. 
Diether et al. (2008) sort stocks into quintiles based on the percentage of daily trading 
volume due to short selling, and study the day (t+2) to day (t+5) holding period. They use the 
Newey-West (1987) approach with lag 5 to adjust for autocorrelation over the overlapping 
holding period. However, Petersen (2006) notes that, although the Newey-West HAC matrix 
estimator is more efficient, its weighting scheme is not as optimal as clustered White (1980) 
standard errors. Also, if there is a requirement to adjust for autocorrelation, the test is mis-
specified. To solve this problem whilst making full use of the daily data, we undertake a 
calendar-time approach to calculate average daily returns. This approach is used by Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000) and Boehmer et al. (2008) to address the overlap problem.  
 
The daily abnormal return on portfolio p, tpAR , , is given by: 
 
∑
=
=
I
i
titp ARI
AR
1
,,
1         (8) 
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tiAR ,  is the abnormal return for the 
thi  stock assigned to portfolio p based on the daily 
ranking of DCR. I is the number of stocks contained in the portfolio. 
 
We skip one day to avoid the bid-ask bounce problem and estimate the abnormal return from 
day (t+2). We establish the window for one day [t+2, t+3], 5 days [t+2, t+6], 10 days [t+2, 
t+11], 20 days [t+2, t+21], and 60 days [t+2, t+61]. The Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) is estimated based on the above windows. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 7 shows summary statistics for the entire sample period (1st September 2003-31st May 
2007) and for three ‘snapshots’: the sample beginning date (1st September), the sample mid-
date (15th July 2005), and the sample end date (31st May 2007). Panel A presents statistics for 
variables related to stock lending. Panel B presents statistics for stock characteristics.  In 
Panel A, by comparing the mean to the median and the upper percentiles for shares on loan, it 
is clear that the distribution of shares on loan is skewed. Likewise, the distribution of the 
Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) is also skewed.  Whereas Cavazos and Savor (2007) find 
increasing short interest for NASDAQ stocks between 1988 and 2001, there is no obvious 
increasing trend in short interest for London Stock Exchange stocks during the period 2003 to 
2007.  
 
[INSERT Table 7 HERE] 
 
4.1   Simple Sorts 
  
For each day, stocks are ranked according to DCR and portfolios containing the 99th, 95th and 
90th percentile of stocks by DCR are constructed. The portfolio characteristics resulting from 
these simple sorts are shown in Table 8: 
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[INSERT Table 8 HERE] 
  
Panel A reports the variables related to short interest and reveals that the higher DCR 
percentiles have higher short-interest. Panel B presents statistics associated with liquidity 
factors: liquidity is generally poorer in portfolios with higher DCRs. Thus, high DCRs 
typically result from the combination of high short interest and poor liquidity. Panel C 
presents statistics for other portfolio characteristics, including stock return volatility, market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratio and past returns. There is no apparent relationship 
between volatility and DCR. The higher DCR portfolios exhibit greater median, but lower 
mean, market capitalizations in comparison to the whole sample. The higher DCR portfolios 
exhibit median book to market ratios that are similar to that of the whole sample, although the 
mean book-to-market ratios are greater, suggesting skew in the distribution of this ratio. 
Boehmer et al. (2008) point out that although short-sellers are able to identify over-valued 
stocks, high levels of short-selling are neither necessarily nor sufficiently related to a low 
book-to-market ratio. There is also no apparent relationship between past returns and DCR.5  
 
Table 9 presents the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns associated with 
higher DCR portfolios. 
 
[INSERT Table 9 HERE] 
 
Table 9 reveals positive abnormal returns for each of the higher DCR portfolios over each 
time period considered. Statistical significance is generally stronger over the longer holding 
periods; and for the 90th and 95th percentiles compared to the 99th percentile. This latter effect 
                                                          
5 In further work that is not reported here, we find that that there is a statistically significant (albeit economically 
modest) evidence of under-performance by stocks with the highest levels of short-interest compared to stocks 
with the lowest levels of short-interest, once adjustment has been made for dividend capture. This is consistent 
with the literature on short-selling and stock returns. 
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is due to the lower volatility of abnormal returns in the 90th and 95th percentile portfolios, 
such that statistical significance can be established at a lower abnormal return. 
 
4.2   Double Sorts 
 
Table 10 shows portfolio characteristics for the higher percentile DCR portfolios, separated 
into ‘crowded exit’ portfolios and ‘all’ portfolios. This allows for a comparison between the 
characteristics of stocks experiencing crowded exits, and all stocks that belong to higher 
percentile DCR portfolios.  
 
[INSERT Table 10 HERE] 
 
In Panel B, it can be seen that mean and median turnover by shares is dramatically lower for 
the ‘Crowded Exits’ portfolios compared to the ‘All’ portfolio, suggesting that lower liquidity 
is an important factor in explaining crowded exits. Panel C reveals little difference in 
volatility of returns, firm size or past returns between the ‘Crowded Exits’ portfolios and the 
‘All’ portfolios. However, the Book-to-Market ratio appears lower for each of the ‘Crowded 
Exits’ portfolios than for the ‘All’ portfolios (i.e. there is a suggestion that crowded exits are 
more commonly associated with non-value or ‘glamour’ stocks).   
 
We examine each of the stocks appearing in the ‘Crowded Exits’ portfolios to identify if 
there are Regulatory News Service releases around the time of the crowded exit. In 
approximately half the cases, there are regulatory news announcements in the period from 7 
days before the start of exceptional short covering. This suggests that publicly-released, 
company-specific news could be the catalyst for a crowded exit in some, but not all, cases. 
Stocks typically stay in the crowded exit portfolio for a limited number of days (a mean of 
3.35 days for the 99th percentile portfolios, 3.55 days for the 95th percentile portfolios and 
4.45 days for the 90th percentile portfolios). 
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For the crowded exit portfolios, we calculate equal-weighted portfolio returns using the 
calendar-time approach over holding periods of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. As before, 
we skip one day to counter the bid-ask bounce problem. This approach is repeated every day. 
We expect stocks experiencing crowded exits to show higher positive AR and CARs than 
stocks that do not experience crowded exits. Results are shown in Table 11: 
 
[INSERT Table 11 HERE] 
 
For each percentile, the ‘Crowded Exits’ column reports the AR and CARs for portfolios of 
stocks that have high Days to Cover Ratios but that also show exceptional decreases in short 
interest – each of these stocks is said to experience a ‘crowded exit’. The ‘Difference’ column 
shows the difference between stocks experiencing crowded exits and those that do not, within 
each percentile group. ‘Crowded Exit’ portfolios have positive AR and CARs, most of which 
are statistically significant. Comparing to the simple sorts, these AR and CARs are also all 
higher. For example, the highest CAR is observed in the 99th percentile over the holding 
period of 60 trading days, with 18.93%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level, 
while the CAR(+60) for the 99th percentile based on a simple sort is only 2.03%, significant 
at the 10% level. The mean CAR(+60) for the 99th percentile Crowded Exit portfolios, at 
18.93%, is also economically significant. This indicates potentially large losses for short-
sellers during crowded exits. Noting from Table 10 that the 99th percentile has an average 
DCR of over 147 days, it is unsurprising that such stocks could remain crowded after 60 
days. Although the positive CARs are not statistically significant over shorter periods, they 
are all statistically significant over periods of 10 days or greater.  
 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that crowded exits represent a risk to short-
sellers. For longer holding periods, results are both statistically and economically significant. 
The greatest CARs are in the highest DCR portfolios.  
 
As a robustness check, we consider stocks that have high Days to Cover Ratios and that also 
exhibit a decrease in shares on loan over a 5 day period (as opposed to exhibiting an 
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‘exceptional’ decrease in shares on loan as defined in Section 3.2). We find that the abnormal 
returns for each category are generally no longer positive, and that none is statistically 
significantly different from 0. This reveals that it is the ‘exceptional’ nature of short-covering 
associated with crowded exits that leads to losses for short-sellers. 
 
 
4.3   Adjustment for Arbitrage 
 
Not all short-sales are motivated by negative opinions on a stock. For example, short-sellers 
might short stocks to conduct convertible bond arbitrage and so take advantage of relative 
mispricing between a stock and a convertible bond issued by the same company. Where a 
short-seller is arbitrage-motivated, he will be partially hedged against movements in the stock 
price. The presence of such arbitrageurs could thus obfuscate our results and weaken the 
power of the tests. We use Thomson One Banker to identify firms with convertible bonds as 
part of their capital structure. We then re-estimate abnormal returns and CARs for the Double 
Sorts, separating firms with convertible bonds from those without. Cavazos and Savor (2007) 
separate firms with convertible securities outstanding in excess of $10M, from those firms 
below this threshold. In this study, we separate firms with any convertible bonds in issue 
from those without convertible bonds, to completely remove any obfuscation due to 
convertible bond arbitrage. Approximately one fifth of stocks in the panel have convertibles 
within their capital structure. Table 12 shows the results from our double sorts, adjusted for 
arbitrage-motivated short-selling. 
 
[INSERT Table 12 HERE] 
 
We expect greater CARs for the non-convertible portfolios compared to the convertible 
portfolios, as short positions in the non-convertible portfolios are not hedged by long 
positions in convertible bonds. In all cases we find greater ARs and CARs for the non-
convertible portfolios, as expected. For the arbitrage-motivated ‘Convertible’ portfolios, all 
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but one of the AR and CARs are insignificant at any level. This is consistent with the findings 
of Diether et al.  (2008) and Cavazos and Savor (2007) on arbitrage-motivated short-selling.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Crowded exits represent an indirect constraint on short-selling. They have yet to be examined 
in the literature, and this study fills this gap. Crowded exits arise in stocks where short-sellers 
hold large positions relative to normal trading volume, and when a catalysts prompts short-
sellers to cover their positions rapidly and simultaneously. A variety of catalysts are possible, 
including, but not limited to, public news releases by companies. Stocks experiencing 
crowded exits are generally associated with higher short interest and poorer liquidity. Those 
short-sellers who successfully cover their positions early avoid losses, indicating that they are 
well-informed. However, crowded exists are associated with economically and statistically 
significant losses to those short-sellers who do not cover their positions. As such, the risk of a 
crowded exit represents an indirect constraint on short-selling.  
 
It is rational for investors to take account of published evidence on stock market anomalies. 
Indeed, a number of quantitative analysts incorporate empirical evidence on stock market 
anomalies into their investment processes, in their constant search for out-performance. 
Various studies suggest that the publication of empirical research influences investor 
behaviour. For example, Lev and Nissim (2004) study short-selling and the ‘accruals 
anomaly’ and find that in recent years institutions have altered their portfolio positions more 
actively in response to accrual disclosures. Wu (2008) argues that “short sellers appear to 
exploit the [post earnings announcement] drift by increasing (decreasing) shorting 
immediately following negative (positive) earnings surprises.” There exists a substantial body 
of literature showing that heavily shorted stocks perform poorly. Furthermore, Cohen et al. 
(2007) show that increasing borrowing demand for a stock is followed by poor performance. 
These studies suggest a potential trading strategy for short-sellers: identify heavily shorted 
stocks (or stocks with increasing borrowing demand) and build short positions in those 
stocks. However, imitation strategies such as these change the market dynamics and can lead 
to unexpected consequences (see Surowiecki, 2004). With imitation, short-positions become 
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more crowded, and the risk of ‘crowded exits’ increases. This could lead to examples of 
‘counter-performativity’, as described by MacKenzie (2006), whereby the widespread and 
plentiful practice of short-selling, as assumed in economic models such as Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory, leads not necessarily to a more efficient market, but to an increasing number of 
occasions on which stock prices move temporarily away from fair value. Indeed, Irvine 
(2005) finds that stocks with higher short interest in any given month also have greater return 
skewness the next month. The path of stock returns can be important to investors employing 
leverage (who are liable to margin calls or subject to loan covenants) and to investment 
agents using open-ended fund structures (who are subject to the risk of redemption by 
clients). Even temporary market imbalances can lead to unexpected, permanent losses as 
these classes of investor become unable to hold on to losing positions.  Crowded exits can 
thus create path dependency problems for short-sellers. 
 
This research makes a contribution to the literature by furthering our knowledge of indirect 
short-sale constraints. It also makes a practical contribution, as our findings suggest practical 
steps that short-sellers can take to mitigate crowded exit risk. First, short-sellers should be 
risk-aware when short-selling less liquid stocks with high days-to-cover ratios. Secondly, 
given the prolonged nature of crowded exits, short-sellers should cover their positions 
immediately upon observing exceptional levels of covering by other shorts-sellers in crowded 
positions. However, such short-covering will in itself exacerbate the crowded exit effect for 
others. A further difficulty in this process is that data on stock lending and short-selling is 
often publicly available only with a time lag. Under such circumstances, private data on stock 
lending flows and short-covering can become valuable. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Raw Dataset 
Descriptive statistics are provided for three points in time: the first day of the sample time period (01/09/2003), the mid-
point (15/07/2005) of the sample time period and the final day of the sample time period (31/05/2007). The descriptive 
statistics are parameters that measure central tendency, dispersion, minimum/maximum values, number of observations, 
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skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics for stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market capitalization on 
loan, shares on loan, book value per share* and free float number of shares (%).  
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Table 2: Histograms for the Raw Dataset 
Histograms for six variables (stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market capitalization on loan, shares on loan, 
book value per share and free float number of shares (%)) are constructed. For the purpose of visualization the histograms 
are produced using the mid-date snapshot (15th July, 2005). In order to improve the granularity of the histograms, outliers of 
greater than three standard deviations from the mean are removed (this is done for the illustrative purposes only).  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Logarithmic Dataset 
Descriptive statistics are provided for three points in time: the first day of the sample time period (01/09/2003), the mid-
point (15/07/2005) of the sample time period and the final day of the sample time period (31/05/2007). The descriptive 
statistics are parameters that measure central tendency, dispersion, minimum/maximum values, number of observations, 
skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics for six variables: stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market 
capitalization on loan, shares on loan, book value per share* and free float number of shares (%).  
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Table 4: Histograms for the Logarithmic Dataset 
Histograms for six variables (stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market capitalization on loan, shares on loan, 
book value per share and free float number of shares (%)) are constructed. For the purpose of visualization the histograms 
are produced using the mid-date snapshot (15th July, 2005). In order to improve the granularity of the histograms, outliers of 
greater than three standard deviations from the mean are removed (this is done for the illustrative purposes only).  
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Table 5: Box-plots 
Box-plots are constructed for each of the six variables in the dataset for the first (01/09/2003) and for the last (31/05/2007) 
snap-shot dates. They intend to provide a visual summary of the outliers in the dataset. For most of the variables there are 
more outliers in the last snapshot of data than in the first one, which is consistent with the notion of a growing panel.   
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Table 6: Outliers 
The top panel of the table shows for each of the six variables the number of observations greater than three standard 
deviations from the mean as well as its equivalent presented as a percentage of the total number of observations. The bottom 
panel of the table presents the number of occasions (and its percentage equivalent) each variable has changed in one day by 
more than three standard deviations from the mean daily change. Both measures aim to capture ‘exceptional’ data points.    
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Shares on loan (millions) Market Cap on loan (%) Free float on loan DCR  
01 Sep 2003-31 May 2007 mean  23.39 2.90 4.68 7  
median 4.40 1.84 2.70 4  
Std.Dev 74.99 3.07 5.68 29  
01 Sep 2003 (Snapshot 1) mean  28.84 2.43 4.57 6  
median 5.50 1.64 2.79 3  
Std.Dev 81.60 2.43 5.18 19  
15 Jul 2005 (Snapshot mean  33.38 3.55 4.55 7  
median 9.90 2.41 2.69 5  
Std.Dev 77.58 3.18 4.39 15  
31 May 2007 (Snapshot 3) mean  33.27 3.37 4.42 8  
median 4.35 2.18 2.53 4  
Std.Dev 191.39 3.66 5.49 28  
Market Cap (millions) Daily Trading Volume B/M Free Fl   
01 Sep 2003-31 May 2007 mean  2293.70 3.24 0.67 66  
median 370.00 0.31 0.50 69  
Std.Dev 8485.05 15.74 1.51 21  
01 Sep 2003 (Snapshot 1) mean  1571.23 4.95 0.89 56  
median 272.00 1.19 0.65 57  
Std.Dev 7165.67 11.56 3.36 14  
15 Jul 2005 (Snapshot mean  2495.48 6.14 0.69 82  
median 383.50 1.75 0.53 85  
Std.Dev 10011.37 12.76 1.19 15  
31 May 2007 (Snapshot 3) mean  2700.54 4.71 0.48 74  
median 459.50 0.84 0.36 78  
Std.Dev 7817.87 10.96 0.37 17  
Panel B: Stock Characteristics Summary Statistics 
Pane A report summary statistics fo different short sellin measures. Shares on Loan is the numbe of shares borrowed over th   
(0 Sep 2003 to 31 Ma 2007) whic we us a the prox of numbe of shares shorted. Market Cap on Loan is the numbe of s   
loa divided b market ca over the sampl period. Free Float on Loan is the numbe of shares on loa divided b the size of f
whic indicate the relationship short sellin activities and stock liquidity. DC (Days to Ratio is the numbe of shares  
divided b average daily trading volume whic indicate how lon i takes short sellers to cove their short positions. Pane B s  
summary statistics of stock characteristics Market Cap is use to measure the size of firm, and B/M refer to lagged boo to m  
defined i Fam Frenc (1993). Tradin Volum is the numbe of shares trade i the market pe day Free Float show the perce  
outstandin shares whic are  closely held Eac pane report statistics fo the entire sampl period and also snapsho   
beginning date (01 Sep 2003), the middle date (15 Jul 2005), and the final date (31 May 
Table 7: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Short Selling Summary 
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All 99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
DCR>19.4 DCR>12.4 DCR>8.11
DCR (days)  Mean 7.88 147.26 52.87 34.71
 Median 4.48 62.68 25.76 19.36
 Std. Dev. 29.29 224.63 119.21 86.97
Shares on Loan  Mean 23.39 25.90 26.31 33.17
(in millions)  Median 4.40 14.10 7.80 9.40
 Std. Dev. 74.99 63.48 58.36 67.72
Mkt Cap on Loan (%)  Mean 2.90 5.60 6.22 6.20
 Median 1.84 3.54 4.66 4.90
 Std. Dev. 3.07 4.19 4.39 4.52
Free Float on Loan(%)  Mean 4.68 9.82 10.77 10.66
 Median 2.70 6.75 7.76 7.93
 Std. Dev. 5.68 7.93 9.05 9.04
Turnover by shares  Mean 3.24 0.45 1.21 1.94
(in millions)  Median 0.31 0.10 0.16 0.26
 Std. Dev. 15.74 2.10 3.82 5.35
Free Float (%)  Mean 66.54 65.34 66.07 66.64
 Median 69.00 65.00 68.00 69.00
 Std. Dev. 21.64 21.64 20.00 20.42
Volatility  Mean 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
 Median 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23
 Std. Dev. 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Mkt Cap  Mean 2294 697 983 1574
(in millions)  Median 370 444 443 499
 Std. Dev. 8485 3740 2980 5093
Book to Market ratio  Mean 0.67 6.21 1.86 1.21
 Median 0.48 0.47 0.55 0.49
 Std. Dev. 37.91 15.36 7.68 5.52
Past Return (%)  Mean 1.93 2.23 1.41 1.49
 Median 1.60 1.67 1.34 1.36
 Std. Dev. 8.37 8.72 7.81 7.60
Table 8: Portfolios based on Simple Sorts
Panel A. Short Interest
Panel B. Stock Liquidity
Panel C. Other Stock Characteristics
This table reports the characteristics of portfolios sorted daily by Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) over the
period 01 September 2003 to 31 May 2007. DCR is calculated as shares on loan divided by average daily
trading volume. The first column shows variables for the entire sample, the following three columns show
the 99th, 95th, and 90th percentiles by DCR respectively. Past Return is calculated as the raw percentage
return of each portfolio over the previous 20 trading days.
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AR(+1)  Mean 0.034 0.020 0.027
t-Stat 1.345 1.720 * 2.429
CAR(+5)  Mean 0.127 0.127 0.116
t-Stat 1.188 2.710 *** 2.951 ***
CAR(+10)  Mean 0.291 0.307 0.263
t-Stat 1.032 3.250 *** 3.423 ***
CAR(+20)  Mean 0.348 0.562 0.622
t-Stat 1.742 * 2.989 *** 4.265 ***
CAR(+60)  Mean 2.027 1.203 1.463
t-Stat 1.682 * 1.970 ** 3.419 ***
The Table reports abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for higher-percentile DCR
portfolios from 01 Sep 2003 to 31 May 2007. Stocks are sorted into 99th, 95th, and 90th percentiles based
on their Days to Cover Ratio (DCR). Portfolios are re-balanced daily. By skipping one day to avoid concerns
about bid-ask bounce, daily abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and t-statistics are calculated
using a calendar-time approach with a holding period of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. All returns are
quoted as percentages. 
Table 9: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns based on Simple Sorts (%)
99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
Note: * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.
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First Sort (By DCR)
Second Sort (By Exceptional Change) All Crowded Exits All Crowded Exits All Crowded Exits
DCR (days)  Mean 147.26 91.43 52.87 36.55 34.71 25.76
 Median 62.68 57.30 25.76 24.56 19.36 18.58
 Std. Dev. 224.63 94.80 119.21 48.08 86.97 34.74
Shares on Loan  Mean 25.90 27.70 26.31 33.41 33.17 45.37
(in millions)  Median 14.10 18.90 7.80 15.70 9.40 16.60
 Std. Dev. 63.48 24.54 58.36 57.53 67.72 84.69
Mkt Cap on Loan (%)  Mean 5.60 4.51 6.22 6.73 6.20 6.73
 Median 3.54 2.98 4.66 5.90 4.90 5.90
 Std. Dev. 4.19 3.87 4.39 4.58 4.52 4.53
Free Float on Loan(%)  Mean 9.82 7.89 10.77 12.02 10.66 12.11
 Median 6.75 3.63 7.76 9.91 7.93 9.90
 Std. Dev. 7.93 7.48 9.05 9.74 9.04 9.73
Turnover by shares  Mean 454.9 0.4 1206.1 1.7 1936.7 3.0
(in millions)  Median 103.2 0.1 161.9 0.3 260.7 0.5
 Std. Dev. 2096 899 3823 3908 5346 8116
Free Float (%)  Mean 65.34 67.21 66.07 64.56 66.64 64.64
 Median 65.00 71.00 68.00 66.00 69.00 67.00
 Std. Dev. 21.64 23.05 20.00 20.82 20.42 21.22
Volatility  Mean 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
 Median 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
 Std. Dev. 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12
Mkt Cap  Mean 696.8 642.7 982.8 1257.5 1573.8 1953.6
 Median 444.0 497.0 443.0 503.0 499.0 587.0
 Std. Dev. 3740 692 2980 2224 5093 6234
B/M  Mean 6.21 0.11 1.86 0.49 1.21 0.49
 Median 0.47 0.15 0.55 0.46 0.49 0.43
 Std. Dev. 15.36 0.86 7.68 0.59 5.52 0.51
Past Return  Mean 0.022 0.02 0.014 0.02 0.015 0.02
 Median 0.017 0.02 0.013 0.02 0.014 0.02
 Std. Dev. 0.087 0.08 0.078 0.07 0.076 0.07
Table 10: Portfolios based on Double Sorts
Panel A. Short Interest
Panel B. Stock Liquidity
Panel C. Other Stock Characteristics
99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
This table reports the characteristics of portfolios sorted according to both Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) and
exceptional decreases in the percentage of free float on loan over the period 01 September 2003 to 31 May 2007.
DCR is calculated as shares on loan divided by average daily trading volume. Exceptional decreases in free float on
loan are identified as described in the Methodology section. For each percentile, the column 'All' shows variables for
all stocks in that percentile group based on a simple sort; the Crowded Exits column reports portfolios which have a
high DCR combined with exceptional falls in short interest, as defined in the Methodology section. Past Return is
calculated as the  raw percentage return of each portfolio over the previous 20 trading days.
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AR(+1)  Mean 0.518 0.233 0.158 0.026 0.151 0.105
t-Stat 0.915 0.641 2.161 ** 0.256 1.332 1.512 *
CAR(+5)  Mean 1.833 0.647 0.404 -0.050 0.402 0.320
t-Stat 0.862 0.523 1.409 -0.133 0.873 1.157
CAR(+10)  Mean 4.916 4.125 1.005 1.065 1.051 0.986
t-Stat 2.191 ** 1.949 ** 2.344 ** 0.834 1.773 * 1.611 *
CAR(+20)  Mean 5.254 5.858 3.403 1.869 3.610 1.986
t-Stat 1.831 * 1.506 * 4.413 *** 1.426 * 2.994 *** 2.012 **
CAR(+60)  Mean 18.930 14.446 5.033 3.022 6.370 3.640
t-Stat 2.065 ** 1.298 * 1.964 ** 0.758 1.703 * 1.324 *
Difference Crowded Exits Difference
Note: * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and *** indicates significance at 1% 
Table 11: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns based on Double Sorts (in %)
The Table reports mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for crowded exit portfolios from 01
Sep 2003 to 31 May 2007. For each day, stocks are first sorted into 99th, 95th, and 90th percentiles based on their Days
to Cover Ratio (DCR). Within each percentile, stocks showing exceptional decreases in short interest (as defined int he
Methodology section) are studied - these stocks are said to experience a 'crowded exit'. For each percentile, the first
column reports the abnormal returns for stocks experiencing a crowded exit. The second column reports the difference in
mean returns between portfolios of stocks experiencing crowded exits and those that do not experience crowded exits. By
skipping one day to avoid concerns about bid-ask bounce, daily abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and t-
statistics are calculated using a calendar-time approach with a holding period of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. All
numbers are quoted as percentages. 
99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
Crowded Exits DifferenceCrowded Exits
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AR(+1)  Mean 0.728 -0.451 0.190 0.040 0.167 0.076
t-Stat 1.117 -1.408 1.295 0.332 1.895 * 1.079
CAR(+5)  Mean 2.350 -0.545 0.494 0.142 0.466 0.108
t-Stat 0.096 -0.476 0.825 0.285 1.443 0.194
CAR(+10)  Mean 6.106 -0.559 1.327 0.338 1.095 0.721
t-Stat 2.279 ** -0.319 1.815 * 0.286 2.120 * 1.054
CAR(+20)  Mean 8.083 -7.759 3.763 3.173 3.569 3.197
t-Stat 2.235 ** -1.831 2.571 ** 1.570 3.974 *** 1.920 *
CAR(+60)  Mean 26.981 -18.103 8.312 0.815 5.514 3.526
t-Stat 2.508 ** -1.423 1.949 * 0.105 1.967 * 0.594
Note: * indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, and *** indicates significant at the 1% lev
non-convertible convertible
Table 12: Double Sort Results Adjusted For Arbitrage
The Table reports mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for crowded exit portfolios from 01 Sep
2003 to 31 May 2007. First, stocks that are experiencing crowded exits are identified based on double sorts. Any company
with a convertible bond in its capital structure is identified as being exposed to arbitrage-motivated short-selling. Crowded
exit stocks are then seperated into 'non-convertible' portfolios and 'convertible' portfolios. By skipping one day to avoid
concerns about bid-ask bounce, daily abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and t-statistics are calculated using a
calendar-time approach with a holding period of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. All numbers are quoted as percentages. 
99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
non-convertible convertiblenon-convertible convertible
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